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THE VALUATION OF OPTION STOCK SUBJECT TO
REPURCHASE OPTIONS AND RESTRAINTS ON
SALE: A NEW TAX BONANZA IN
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION*
CORPORATE officers or employees frequently are given options to purchase
the corporation's stock at a price below market value.' Since market value
generally mirrors the worth of total rights conveyed by the stock, a party
exercising one of these "bargain" options receives concrete economic gain to
the extent of the spread between market and option price. And, as a general
rule, when the economic benefit is considered "compensation," and hence
taxable as ordinary income to the employee, the tax is determined by refer-
ence to the spread at the time the option is exercised.2 In some situations,
however, ostensibly for the purpose of retaining a party in the corporation's
employ, or perhaps for other reasons, the corporation may place special re-
strictions on stock purchased through its bargain options.3 There may be tem-
porary prohibitions against sale of the stock by the optionee.4 Or the cor-
poration may retain a right-either temporary or permanent-to repurchase
the stock, at a given price, at will 5 or on the occurrence of some specified
event such as termination of employment." Here, there is no public market
*Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952); Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951).
1. For a comprehensive and penetrating analysis of the option device, see generally,
Lyon, Employee Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 COL. L. REV. 1 (1951).
See also Alexander, Employee Stock Options and the 1950 Revenue Act, 6 TAx L. R.v.
165 (1951) ; Comment, 34 MARQ. L. Rav. 211 (1951).
2. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-1 (1946).
3. Restrictions may be used to retain an employee, to keep the company's shares off
the market for a limited period, to preserve the sanctity of a closed corporation, or, as
in Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951), see note 30 infra, to keep the shares available to
the majority stockholders in case they wish to include these shares in a sale of their own
interests. For a general discussion of various types of restrictions and the tax treatment
they receive, see Molloy, Restraints on Alienation and the Internal Revenue Code, 7
TAx L. REV. 439 (1952) ; Note, Valuation of Restricted Shares for Taxr Purposes, 90
U. OF PA. L. REv. 346 (1942).
4. See, e.g., Propper v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 617, 618 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Morris D.
Kopple, 35 B.T.A. 1056, 1057-8 (1937).
5. Cf. Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936); Helen S. Delone, 6 T.C. 1188,
1189 (1946).
6. See, e.g., Spitzer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 967, 968-70 (8th Cir. 1946) (subject
to repurchase if employee terminates his employment or dies) ; Kline v. Commissioner,
130 F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 1942) (subject to repurchase if the employee desires to sell,
terminates his employment, or dies) ; Halsted James, 3 T.C. 1260, 1261 (1944), aff'd per
curam, 148 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1945) (same) ; Fostoria Glass Co. v. Yoke, 45 F. Supp.
962, 963 (N.D.W. Va. 1942) (subject to repurchase if participant in pooling arrangement
wishes to sell).
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for the restricted shares themselves, and market value of unrestricted shares
may be a totally unreliable index of the value of the restricted shares. There-
fore, if the optionee is to be taxed on the amount of his gain when he exercises
the option, some index must be developed for appraising the value of the
restricted shares.
Courts have adopted different methods, depending on the nature of the re-
strictions, to value restricted stock for tax purposes.7 Where a corporation re-
tains the right to repurchase the stock at will, courts hold the value of the
restricted stock to be equivalent to the repurchase price.8 When the corporation's
right to repurchase is contingent upon some event such as the employee's
desire to sell or the termination of employment, or when the option stock can-
not be sold by the stockholder for a specified time period, the value of re-
stricted stock is set by reducing the market value of similar unrestricted shares
presumably to reflect impairment of value due to the restriction.0 There is,
however, no precise test for calculating the amount of the reduction.10 Finally,
when restrictions are imposed on stock which is otherwise "highly specula-
7. At one time, the courts refused to recognize the effect of restrictivns in -aluing the
stock, and the recipient of the stock was taxed on the spread between option price and
fair market price. G & K Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner. 76 F2d 454, 456 14th Cir.).
re-rd on other grounds. 296 U.S. 30- (1935): cf. Wright v. Commissi.ner, F0 F.2d 727.
729-30 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 652 (1931).
8. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1935); cf. Wils.i v. Biwers, 57 F.2d 632.
684 (2d Cir. 1932) ; and cases cited note 5 supra.
9. The question has arisen primarily in gift tax cases which htkld that the shares' value
need not be limited to repurchase price, but that the presence of the restriction must h cvn-
sidered when making the valuation. This rule has been applied in cases where the repurchase
price is fixed but the exercise of the option is conditional, see Halsted James, 3 T.C. 12,0
(1944), aff'd, 148 F2d 236 (2d Cir. 1945), and in cases where exercise is cilnditional and
the repurchase price is conditional (for instance, where the repurchase price is t.# Ite a
given percentage of book value at the time the repurchase option is exercised). See C.,m-
missioner v. McCann, 146 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Krauss v. United States, 51 F. Supp.
388 (1943), aff'd, 140 F2d 510 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Charles T. Kline, 44 B.T.A. 1052 (1941 ,
aff'd, 130 F2d 742 (3d Cir. 1942). The same result is reached where the sale of shares
is temporarily forbidden, and the shares are not highly speculative in nature. Heiner v.
Gwinner, 114 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 714 (1940) (one year restraint
on sale).
10. When valuing restricted shares, courts have looked to all relevant factors. See
Commissioner v. 'McCann, 146 F.2d 385, 386 (2d Cir. 1944), where the court cited as
relevant factors: "the prospective earnings, the likelihood that the donor would not re-
tire; his expectancy in life; his power to change the by-laws; his opportunity to sell to
another employee-with the director's consent-; and any other factor. . . ." And see Rose
Spitzer, P-H 1947 TC 'Mma. DEc. 147,076 (1947) (shares in finance company), where the
court considered: "the company's net worth, its earning power, dividend-paying capacity,
the war conditions, the government credit restrictions on installment buying, the declin-
ing market on the basic date, and the testimony of the expert witnesses... :' On remand,
in Harrison K. McCann, P-H 1946 TC MIrs. DEc. 1,46,042 (1946), the Tax Court simply
stated, "We have considered all of the evidence as directed by the Circuit Court and upon
that evidence we find as a fact that the value of the 2,500 shares . . . was $117,500... :'
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tive" courts have refused to set any value at all for the restricted stock on
grounds that value is simply unascertainable.11 Because restrictions imposed
on shares either reduce their value, with the result that taxable spread is de-
creased, or render value unascertainable, in which case no tax is levied at all
at the time an option is exercised, placing the restrictions on stock purchased
through bargain options provides a potential tax avoidance device.' " Any
amount which escapes taxation when the option is exercised will then be taxed
when stock is sold.13 But this tax will be at capital gains rather than higher
ordinary income rates, the taxpayer may select a favorable year for incurring
the tax by postponing sale, and the tax may be avoided entirely if the tax-
payer does not sell during his lifetime. 14
In the past, however, restrictions have been used rarely since their use
presented several disadvantages. Taxpayers were reluctant to replace cash
compensation with bargain shares subject to repurchase at the will of the
Similarly, in Spitzer, after listing the relevant factors, the Tax Court stated, "[W]c
conclude ... the stock had a value of $120 a share."
The variance in "relevant" factors, as well as the abrupt transition from factors to
conclusion, indicate that translation of restrictions into cash value is a mystery best de-
scribed as case by case ad hoc determinations. See also Nee v. Katz, 163 F.2d 256 (8th
Cir. 1947), where the Court of Appeals, in remanding for the lower court's failure to state
that all relevant factors had been considered, conceded that after consideration of these
factors, the lower court might affirm its former decision. On remand, this is what the
lower court did. Katz v. Nee, 74 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
11. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 499 (1937); United States v. State
Street Trust Co., 124 F.2d 948 (1st Cir. 1942), affirming 37 F. Supp. 846 (D. Mass,
1941) ; and cases cited note 4 sapra. See Molloy, Restraints on Alienation and the Intcrnal
Revenue Code, 7 TAx L. REv. 439 (1952) ; Note, 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 346, 354-6 (1942).
12. See, e.g., Halsted James, 3 T.C. 1260 (1944), aff'd, James v. Commissioner, 148
F.2d 236 (Zd Cir. 1945) (reduced value resulting in lower taxable spread); and cases
cited -note 9 siqpra. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 499 (1937) (where
shares' value unascertainable, receipt of such shares gives rise to no taxable income);
cf. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1935) (shares' basis for capital gain purposes
limited to cost where corporation might repurchase shares at will at a price equal to the
employee's option price).
13. Since the basis for capital gain purposes is the cost of stock plus the taxed spread,
see U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a) -1 (1946), any portion of the spread which escapes
taxation at the time the option is exercised will not be included in the basis figure. There-
fore, the difference between selling price and basis will be increased, and the capital gain
will be greater.
14. If the spread is taxed at capital gains rates, the tax rate will not exceed 26%,
see INT. Rxv. CODE § 117(c) (2) ; whereas if the tax were at ordinary rates, a high
salaried corporate executive would be taxed at a far higher rate. Since a capital gains
tax is not imposed until the shares are disposed of, see INT. REv. CoDt § 112(a), taxpayer
can postpone payment of the tax until a year in which he has offsetting capital losses, with
the result that he actually may pay no tax. Furthermore, if the taxpayer does not sell
within his lifetime, tax is never imposed on the original spread since the taxpayer's heirs
receive as a basis for the stock its fair market value at the date of the taxpayer's death.
INT. REv. CODE § 113(a) (5).
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corporation since the bargain could be withdrawn at any time 1 5 and the stock
could not be sold for more than the price of the corporation's repurchase op-
tion.1" And of course, conditionally exercisable repurchase options and re-
straints on sale also limited the use of the shares to the stockholder. Moreover,
the precise amount of tax benefit to be obtained by placing restrictions on
stock was not readily ascertainable in advance,17 and the uncertainty in valua-
tion opened the way for possible litigation between the taxpayer and the Com-
missioner. In the light of these disadvantages it was patently more practical
until 1946 to use "proprietary" options, i.e., options designed to give an em-
ployee a stake in the business rather than compensate him, since the spread
on stock purchased under a "proprietary" option wNas not taxed until stock-
holder sold the shares and then was taxed at capital gains rates.'8 When the
usefulness of "proprietary" options was left in doubt by the 1946 Supreme
Court decision in Commissioner v. Smith 10 and subsequent Treasury Regu-
lations,20 attention focused on invalidating the Regulations or obtaining special
15. But the corporation, in the interest of gud employer-empoy ee reati 'ns, may"
not exercise its rights. See Helvering v. Salvage. 297 U.S. 10t6 (1935), where the opti n
to repurchase at $100 was not exercised even though the unrestricted value of the t,,dz
was $1,164.70. However, if the company is mt a closed corporatio n. a stiddi, dder's deri-
vative suit might lie to force exercise of the repurchase optivn C-r to hold directors liahle
for failure to exercise it. In any event, the employee would -Probably prefer a safer iorm
of compensation.
16. No purchaser will pay mre than the repurchase price because if the empl, .ve
no longer holds the shares there is nothing, not even considerati,,ns of empls .e m .rale,
to prevent the corporation from exercising its rights.
17. Since the manner in which courts gave cash value to the restricti ii a a m s.-
tery, see note 10 supra, taxpayers could not readily determine the tax henefit thL* would
receive when restrictions were used.
18. Omaha Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1935); Delbert B.
Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 253, 263-4 (1938); Gordon M. Evans, 33 B.T.A. 140%, 1412-13
(1938) ; see also Herbert H. Springford, 41 B.T.A. 1001 (1940). In distinguishing fe.-
tween compensatory and proprietary options, the courts looked to the intent of the partie,.
For discussion of the problems involved in ascertaining intention, see Sax, Stch Optliis,
23 TAxEs 505 (1945) (listing 38 factors which indicate intent to compensate and 30 which
indicate intent to grant a proprietary option); Bastedo, Taxing Employees on Stork
"Purchases." 41 COL. L. REv. 239 (1941) ; Note, 50 HAMv. L REv. 500 (1937). A clever
draftsman could easily create an option which would be held proprietary. See Sax, smspra,
at 510.
19. 324 U.S. 177 (1945), rehcaring dcnicd, 324 U.S. 695 (1945).
20. The amended Regulation, U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-i (1946), attempted
to do away with the proprietary option concept by declaring that the spread behveen cost
and market price is, in all cases, compensation. Presumably the regulation was based on
dicta in the Smith case which suggested that any economic benefit accruing t.0 an em-
ployee where employee-employer relations are involved is compensation. Commissioner
v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945).
The change in the Regulations has been criticized as being an unwarranted extension
of the Smith holding. See, e.g., SEv. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1950). The
attitude of the courts on this question is unclear. Compare Van Dusen %. Commissioner,
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legislative treatment for stock options ;21 the possibility of using restric-
tions on stock to obtain tax benefits was apparently ignored. With the pas-
sage of Section 130A of the Internal Revenue Code, under which qualified
options are given substantial tax benefits, 22 option plans have been drawn
primarily with an eye to qualify under 130A. But two recent decisions in the
Tax Court may vault into prominence the use of restrictions on stock in bar-
gain options.
In Harold H. Kuchman 23 the taxpayer exercised an option to purchase
shares of the corporation which employed him. Under the option, he paid
$5 per share for stock which, if unrestricted, would have had an approximate
value of $25.24 The stock was subject to a one year restraint on alienation
and to an option, held by the corporation, to repurchase at $5 per share if the
taxpayer left the company within the next year.25 Kuchman argued that his
option was "proprietary" and, consequently, that no tax should be levied on
exercise of the option.26 But the court did not decide this issue. Instead, the
court reasoned that because of the restrictions no buyer would pay more than
$5 per share and because of the future value of the stock and the temporary
166 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948), affirming 8 T.C. 388 (1947) (Smith dicta followed, old
regulation ignored), with Norman G. Nicolson, 13 T.C. 690 (1949) (amended regulation
ignored). The opinions of the commentators as to the validity of the regulations are
similarly divergent. Compare Boland, Employee Options Under the Federal Income Tax,
28 TAxEs 415, 418-20 (1950), with Alexander, Employee Stock Options and the 1950
Revenue Act, 6 TAX L. RE,. 165, 172-3 (1951). For argument that newly created § 130A
of the Internal Revenue Code, containing special treatment for qualifying stock options,
precludes the proprietary option from constituting any legitimate basis for tax treatment
different from the Treasury Regulations, see Alexander, supra, at 202-3.
21. For discussion of attempts to obtain remedial legislation, see Lyon, Employee
Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 CoL L. RaV. 1, 15-16 (1951). In 1948,
an option law was passed by the House of Representatives, but it was never voted on In
the Senate. For discussion of this bill, see Dann, Employee Stock Options Under H.R.
6712, 37 GEO. L.J. 242 (1949). For discussion regarding the validity of the amended Regu-
lation, see articles cited note 20 supra.
22. INT. REv. CoDE § 130A. For the requirements of this section, see note 39 infra.
For the tax benefits obtainable under this section, see notes 40-1 in!ra.
23. 18 T.C. 154 (1952).
24. This is the value the Commissioner placed on the shares. Id. at 162. It is also
the price at which the shares were being offered to the public. Id. at 161. Although this
valuation may be open to criticism, there is little doubt that the shares were worth far
more than $5.
25. Id. at 159. The repurchase option probably could be exercised only if the em-
ployce chose to leave the company during the following year. The stock was subject to
the further restriction that if the taxpayer wished to sell during the first two years after
the restraint on sale had lapsed, he was required first to offer the shares to the company
at the then market price. This last restriction would have no effect on the shares' market
value. See James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1163-4 (1928) ; Jay N. Darling, 4 B.T.A. 499,
502 (1926).




nature of the restrictions no seller would sell for $5. Thus, the court con-
cluded that it was impossible to ascertain the value of the restricted shares.?-
As a result, no tax was levied on the spread between option price and an
estimate as to what the stock might have been worth, even though after one
year the value of the stock would have increased almost 500 percent. The
Commissioner acquiesced in the decision.23
In Rdbert Lehman,29 another Tax Court case just prior to Kuch;an, the
taxpayer received, as compensation for services, a bargain option which he
exercised two years later. The stock purchased under the option could not be
sold for eleven months from the purchase date. Moreover, if within the eleven
months the majority stockholders sold their interest in the company, they could
include in the sale the shares held by Lehman. provided they paid him the same
price they were receiving for their own stock.c0 Shortly after the restrictions
terminated, Lehman sold the shares and reported the profit as capital gain. On
the ground that the restrictions made value unascertainable, the Commissioner
had imposed no tax at the time the option to purchase the shares was exer-
cised.31 But the Commissioner did assert that income was realized and thus
tax was due in the year the restrictions terminated. Accordingly, he attempted
to include in the taxpayer's ordinary income the difference between the cost
of the stock and its value immediately after the restrictions expired; only the
increase in value that occurred between the time of expiration and the time
of sale was treated as capital gain. But the Tax Court held that the expira-
tion of restrictions was not a taxable event and thus treated the entire gain
as capital gain.32 Again, the Commissioner acquiesced. 33
Read together, the Kuchman and Lehman cases remove the major practical
difficulties in the use of bargain option stock with restrictions as an attrac-
tive device for compensating officers and employees. As a result of Kvich-
man, it is simple to create restrictions that will make value unascertainable.
The corporation need only retain a one-year option to repurchase stock at
its cost to the employee, and condition the repurchase option on the employee's
27. Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154, 162-3 (1952). This determination is nt in
line with prior decisions. See notes 9, 11 supra.
28. 1952 INT. RE . BuLL. No. 18 at 1 (1952).
29. 17 T.C. 652 (1951).
30. Brief for Petitioner, p. 3; Brief for Respondent, pp. 10-11, Robert Lehman, 17
T.C. 652 (1951). The provisions were to last for three years from the time the optin was
granted. At the time the option was exercised, all but eleven months of this period had
expired.
31. In this, the Commissioner was probably in error. Since restraint on sale and the
repurchase restriction were to remain in effect only a short time, and since repurchase
would have resulted in bringing close to the shares' market value to Lehman, these re-
strictions probably should not have rendered value unascertainable under the existing law
unless the value of the shares unrestricted v.as "speculative.' See notes, 9, 11 supra.
32. For the facts and holding of the decision, see Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652, 653-4
(1951).
33. 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 3.
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leaving the corporation.34 Since this condition is largely within the employee's
control, he is not receiving a bargain that may readily be withdrawn.8 More-
over, by the end of the year, he will hold stock free of restraints. At the same
time, bolstered by the Commissioner's acquiescence, the taxpayer faces little
uncertainty in the tax benefit to be derived: since value of the restricted shares
is unascertainable and not merely reduced, he cannot be taxed at all when he
exercises the option ;36 and the Lehman case at least implies that any later
tax assessment must be at capital gains rates and only when the stock is sold,,"
The Kuchman type option compares favorably with any other available form
of stock option compensation. While a proprietary option might confer the
same tax benefits as does an option falling within Kitchman, current Treasury
Regulations indicate that the Commissioner, at least, views the proprietary
option as defunct.38 Consequently, attempts to establish proprietary options
simply invite litigation and the danger that courts may support the Regulations
and thus tax the optionee at ordinary income rates on the spread between
market and option price. Section 130A of the Internal Revenue Code also
offers favored treatment for qualifying bargain options.39 Under 130A, if option
34. See Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154, 159 (1952). It is possible that the same
result can be obtained by using restrictions other than those used in Kuchmnan. Short
term repurchase options conditioned on the employee's desire to sell or on his death, or
long term options conditioned on the same factors may invoke similar tax treatment.
While in most situations, all three conditions: desire to sell, death, and termination of
employment have been present, the Kuchman case involved only the latter condition.
Consequently, whether either of the former conditions, alone or together, will make value
unascertainable is problematical, although the Kuchman rationale seems equally appli-
cable to all three.
The Lehman restriction (repurchase contingent on sale by majority stockholders of
their interests) suggests the possibility that value may be held unascertainable even where
the occurrence of the condition enabling repurchase is unlikely. In Lehman, there is no
evidence that the Commissioner investigated the possibilities of a sale by the stockholders,
so that actually there may have been little chance that such a sale would have been
made. It is conceivable that repurchase can be conditioned on a merger or consolidation
within a short period when, in fact, there is almost no possibility of the event taking place.
If the Commissioner does not look behind such a restriction, its presence should, by
analogy to Lehman, prevent the ascertainment of value.
35. Since the opportunity to exercise a repurchase option will probably not induce a
corporation to discharge a competent employee, the exercise of a repurchase option which
is conditioned on termination of employment is largely within control of the employee.
Moreover, in the Kuchinan case, the wording of the repurchase option indicates that it
would become operative only if the employee resigned voluntarily. See Harold H. Kuch-
man, 18 T.C. 154, 159 (1952).
36. See id. at 162-3; and cases cited note 11 supra.
37. The court, in stating that the profit was properly reported as capital gain when
the shares were sold, used broad language stating that any attempt to tax at ordinary
income rates on the expiration of restrictions would not succeed. Robert Lehman, 17
T.C. 652, 654 (1951). But see note 49 infra.
38. See note 20 supra.
39. The requirements that must be met for an option to qualify under § 130A are:
the option must be granted to an employee, INT. REV. CoDE § 130A(a) ; the spread cannot
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price is 95% of market price, the optionee will obtain tax benefits similar to
Kuchman'sY' However, the obvious virtue of the Kuchman type option is the
larger spread that can be used. The 95%-130A option offers the employee
a bargain with only a 5% margin of safety. Consequently, any shift in the
market may eliminate the entire gain. Under Kuchman, the same bargain
might be obtained by the purchase of fewer shares at larger discounts, and
thus minor market changes may reduce but will not eliminate the bargain.
Section 130A also offers some favored tax treatment for stock purchased under
options at 85% to 95% of market price: tax on the spread is at ordinary in-
come rates; but the tax may be postponed until the stock is sold, or, if the
stock remains unsold, until the stockholder's death.4 1 Here, a Kuchman type
option can provide not only a larger spread, but also a tax at capital gains
rates and the possibility that the tax can be entirely avoided if the tawpayer
never sells his stock. Additionally, a Kuchman type option can secure favored
tax treatment in situations which do not qualify at all under 130A. The option
may be used to compensate parties other than employees (as in the Lchwaa
case where it was granted to compensate an investment banker) ; or it may
be given to an individual even if he owns or controls more than 101 of the
corporation's voting stock. And a corporation need not confine its bargain
offer to its own shares or those of its parent or subsidiaries; favored tax treat-
ment will be accorded where a company is disposing of its holdings in any
other corporation.'
Placing restrictions on option stock provides such a generous and obvious
tax avoidance device that future attempts to take advantage of the Kuchman
type option may be unsuccessful despite the Commissioner's acquiescence in
exceed 15%, id. § 130A(b) ; the option cannot be transferable, id. § 130A(d) (1) (B) ;
the recipient of the option must not own or control more than 10f, uf he cmplying
company's voting stock, id. § 130A(d) (1) (C); the shares offered must be those of
the employing company or of its parent or subsidiary, id. § 130A(di (1); and the
shares may not be disposed of by the employee for two years from the time the option
was granted, nor for six months from the time the option was exercised, id. § l.3A
(a), (b).
40. Id. § 130A (a). If an option qualifies under this section, no tax is impo.ed when
the option is exercised and only a capital gains tax is paid when the shares are sold. See
I-ins, What Is ANea? in Enployce Stock Options. 10 N.Y.U. INSn'T. FE. TAx 121, 129-
30 (1952).
41. INT. Rnv. CoDE § 130A(b). This tax is measured by the lesser of the difference
between either cost and fair market value at the time the option was granted, or cost and
fair market value at the time of sale or death.
42. Since Ki:chwan and Lchman were decided on a rationale of unascertainabilit),
the existence of 130A qualifications is irrelevant for obtaining a favored treatment under
these cases. In fact, both cases involved situations which would not fall under § 130A:
in Lehman the option was granted to an independent contractor, rather than to an em-
ployee, Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652, 653 (1951), mid in Ku dm:an the offering was made
by an underwriter, with the result that the shares were not thuse of the issuing company
or its parent or subsidiary. Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 152, 158 (1952).
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the Kuchman and Lehman decisions. Section 130A of the Internal Revenue
Code contains special legislation permitting favored treatment for stock option
plans, but only in limited circumstances which pose requirements that both the
taxpayer and corporation must meet. Kuchman and Lehman, if completely
followed, undermine congressional choice of the type of favored treatment
and the limitations imposed by Congress on situations in which such treatment
should be available.43 Thus, when restrictions are placed on option stock in
the future, the Commissioner may attack, or at least distinguish, the Kuchman
and Lehman holdings. Of course, any major reversion to prior law may make
the Kuchman type option unattractive once again and may endanger benefits
from plans drafted to fall within Kuchman.44
Aside from argument based on congressional intent, there are doctrinal
grounds to buttress an attack against a Kuchman type option. The K'uchman
case, for example, represents a substantial change of prior law. Before the
decision, the value of restricted shares was unascertainable only where the
value of the stock without restrictions would have been "highly speculative."4
Thus Kuchman may be directly attacked as erroneous, since courts would
have previously evaluated the restricted shares when the option was exercised.
To attack in this way, however, the Commissioner's acquiescence would have
to be withdrawn. But even if the decision is accepted, future situations may
readily be designated as falling outside its scope. Restrictions on Kuchman's
stock were imposed, apparently without regard to tax motives, because of the
company's dire need to retain his services in a period of reorganization.4 1
Where circumstances indicate that restrictions are imposed to obtain tax bene-
fits rather than for any urgent necessity to retain the employee's services,47
Kuchman can conceivably be held inapplicable and the restrictions ignored as
an attempt to avoid the limitations of Section 130A. At the same time, the
Lehman case does not necessarily preclude an attempt to assess the total bar-
gain, i.e., the spread between option price and the original market price of
unrestricted shares, at ordinary income rates when restrictions expire. In
Lehman, the court dismissed the Commissioner's attempt to tax at ordinary
43. For § 130A requirements, see note 39 supra. At least one commentator has argued
on identical grounds that § 130A precludes favored treatment for proprietary options. See
Alexander, Employee Stock Options and the 1950 Revenue Act, 6 TAX L. REV. 165, 202-3
(1951).
44. Under prior law, the Kmihnan restrictions would have caused a reduction in value
thus creating considerable uncertainty as to the precise tax effect of any restriction, see
notes 9, 10 supra. This uncertainty alone would deprive the Kuchman option of much of
its utility for tax avoidance. And, of course, if the reduction is not substantial, tax benefits
may be greatly limited.
45. See notes 9, 11 supra.
46. Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154, 158 (1952).
47. The distinction might rest on the presence of some urgent business purpose. But
such a test will invite litigation since it will be difficult to draw the line between urgent
and ordinary business purposes.
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rates the spread between option price and narket price whnc; restrictions e.r-
pired. And its conclusion that expiration of restrictions is not a taxable event
was predicated in response to the Commissioner's argument that income vas
realized by the lifting of restrictions. 48 Acquiescence may be interpreted as
an assent only to the court's conclusion regarding the particular spread liti-
gated and the fact that no income was realized. Then it may be urged that
the year of realization of income is irrelevant since, whenever income may
have been realized, it cannot as a practical matter be assessed until restrictions
do lift.49 The situation is analogous to others where practical reasons result
in assessment of tax in a year in which gain or loss did not occur, as for
example, in the tax treatment of a recipient of blocked currency.-'
But the possibility of attack on future Ruchman type options should not
deter taxpayers from using them, especially since some options may be drafted
to guarantee some tax benefits regardless of attack. On the strength of the
48. See Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652, 654 (1951).
49. It must be noted, however, that under certain circumstances, courts may find
that lifting of restrictions does result in realization of income by the stockholder. If, for
instance, stock is subject to a permanent repurchase option which is exercisable at the
termination of employment, the employee should anticipate repurchase upon retirement.
But, if at any later time, the company waives its right to repurchase, the employee then
possesses completely unrestricted shares. Any difference between the repurchase price
and the market value of unrestricted shares at the time of waiver is analogous to a bonus
for the employee and consequently might be taxed at ordinary rates at that time. But
cf. Frances Elliott Clark, 28 B.T.A. 1225, 1230-1 (1933), aff'd, 77 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1935)
(the removal of restrictions by the employer wvras held to give rise to no ta-able income
whatsoever). If the courts hold a contrary view, then corporations can always safely
provide for tax-favored compensation to its employees by granting stock subject to re-
purchase options and later lifting the restrictions long before the condition may occur.
50. When a tax-payer earns income in a foreign country, and that money is subject to
restrictions which limit its use, the taxpayer may defer reporting this income until the
restrictions are lifted, in which case he receives income in the later year to the extent of
the value of the money in that year. See Mim. 6475, 1950-1 CLT?!. BuLu. 50.
A similar result is reached in cases where an employee is promised a stock bonus, on
the condition that he remain with the corporation for a specific period of time. In Fred
C. Hall, 15 T.C. 195 (1950), the shares were issued to the employee when the bonus
agreement was signed. He immediately indorsed the certificates in blank and turned them
over to the corporation's treasurer, who held them until the employee had remained with
the corporation the required time. The court held that the employee received the bonus
in the later years after the required services had been performed and tax was based on
the shares' value in the later year. The same result is reached even though the employee
receives dividends on the shares during the escrow period, see Roscoe H. Aldrich, 3 B.T..
911 (1926), or he is able to borrow from the company, using the stock as collateral, dur-
ing the escrow period. See Phillip W. Haberman, 31 B.T.A. 75 (1934), aff'd, 79 F2d
995 (2d Cir. 1935).
Both the blocked currency and the defeasible bonus situations are support for over-
ruling the Lehnas decision, since in both cases the tax is based on value in the year when
restrictions end. But they also are precedent for distinguishing Lchunan, and taxing the
original spread when restrictions lift, since they permit tax to be levied at a more prac-
tical time when value is not ascertainable in the year of receipt.
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Commissioner's acquiescence alone, corporations and employees may find it
worthwhile to adopt Kuchman type options-most probably where require-
ments of 130A cannot be met or where large spreads are particularly desir-
able. Indeed, since acquiescence is not to be taken lightly 51 and tax benefits
are substantial, there is considerable justification for gambling with a Kuch-
man type option in almost any circumstance except where parties desire and
are able to fall within the 95 % provisions of 130A. Use of the Kuchman type
option, however, is made especially attractive by the possibility of drafting an
option which will qualify under the 85% to 951% provisions of 130A and, at the
same time, contain restrictions bringing the option stock within Kiuchman.2
As a result, the taxpayer may use up to a 15% spread and be assured that
he will not be taxed until stock is sold or until his death, and, if Kuchman
type options remain unassailed, he can receive the additional benefits made
available by the Kitchnman and Lehman cases.
The Commissioner and the courts should plug up the huge loophole created
by the Kuchman and Lehman cases. When restrictions are placed on stock
it is undoubtedly difficult, if not impossible, to value the shares accurately in
order to tax the stockholder. But the solution provided by the two recent
Tax Court decisions resolves the difficulty only at the expense of undermin-
ing congressional intent and creating favored tax treatment for a special class
of taxpayers 3 Alternative to the Tax Court's position lies a whole range of
possibilities for tax treatment. Illustrative are the approaches of: taxing at
the expiration of restrictions the original spread or spread at expiration; evalu-
ating the stock at reduced amount when the option is exercised; limiting the
Kutchman doctrine to restrictions which serve urgent "business purposes." These
51. "Acquiescence by the Commissioner in a Tax Court decision usually means that
the decision will be accepted by the Commissioner as a precedent in closing similar cases.
However, the Commissioner has, in a few instances, revoked or withdrawn his acqui-
escence. . . ." 3 P-H 1953 FED. TAX SERV. 28,405 (1953).
52. The addition of Kuchman restrictions to a 130A option would not be burden-
some. Under § 130A, the employee cannot sell for six months from the time of purchase.
The addition of Kutchman, restrictions increases that period to one year, but under lKuch.
man, when the employee exercises his option immediately, one year is the longest time
he will be kept from selling; whereas under § 130A if the employee exercises the option
immediately he must hold the shares for two years since § 130A also requires the shares
to be held for two years from the time of grant. Therefore, it is only where the em.
ployee, under a 130A option, does not exercise the option for' at least a year that the
Kuichman sale restraint will add to his burdens. The addition of the one-year repurchase
option does increase the burdens on the employee, but the increase is slight, and it should
not make the 130A option unattractive. For discussion of non-Kuchman restrictions
which may receive the same treatment as Mr. Kuchman's, see note 34 supra.
53. Generally, stock option compensation is used for corporate executives, Indeed,
the passage of § 130A giving the stock options favored treatment under limited circum-
stances was vehemently criticized as socially unwise special class legislation. See Lyon,
Employee Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 COL. L. Rav. 1, 3, 54-7




alternatives, however, either retain old difficulties, create new litigious ques-
tions, leave the tax loophole open, or tax "unfairy."54 Perhaps the best solu-
tion to the problem is to revert to the position of the courts prior to 1935:
ignore restrictions for tax purposes. At first blush, this approach may appear
unfair to those who use the option for restricted stock for reasons other than
tax avoidance, for restrictions do factually reduce value and the taxpayer will
thus be assessed on more than he actually receives when he exercises the op-
tion. Apart from tax purposes, however, restrictions involved in litigation
thus far have been designed primarily to guarantee an employee's services to
the corporation, or to stimulate employee incentive while keeping the corpora-
tion closed.r6 In fact, the corporation has command of many other devices to
exact the same guarantees just as effectively, 7 Thus ignoring restrictions
54. Overruling Kirchwan. and holding that repurchase options reduce value, might
block the loophole because of the uncertainty that voiuld be created. But return to law
which is so hard to administer seems unwise and may hreed liti-ation. See ntes 9, 11
supra. Limiting the Kuchnman rule to a situation where there is an urgent business neces-
sity wil also be unsatisfactory since the question of whether conditions create an urgent
or merely an ordinary business necessity is litigious.
Overruling Lhwman, thereby taxing spread at the time restrictions expire, can be said
to be unfair to the- taxpayer since gain in market value from the time tf exercise until
restrictions end will be taxed as ordinary income rather than capital gain. But see nmte
50 supra, where in situations similar to this, a tax has been levied when restrictions ex-
pire. On the other hand, this action may not entirely block the loophole. If the restricticns
expire or are lifted after many years. at a time when the employee is in a lower income
bracket, the taxpayer will obtain postponement benefits similar to those provided by
§ 130A(b). See note 41 supra. Distinguishing Lehman so as to make tax on the original
spread possible at the restriction's end may also be unfair to the taxpayer, since he will
be ta-ed on his original spread even though the market price may have dropped consider-
ably. Again, the employee may still gain the benefit of postponement of taxation. Of
course, to the extent that there is little arm's-length dealing bctween corporations and
recipients of option stock, the postponement possibility becomes even more attractive
since the corporation may select the taxpayer's choice of year for lifting restrictions. And
see note 49 supra.
55. See G & K Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 454, 456 (4th Cir.), rczid
on other grounds, 296 U.S. 389 (1935) ; Newman v. Commissioner, 40 F2d 225 (10th
Cir. 1930) ; and case cited note 7 supra. See also Note. 83 U. oF PA. L Rcv. 1023 (1935).
56. For use of restrictions to help retain employees' services, see Kline v. Com-
missioner, 130 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1942) (repurchase price contingent on conditions under
which severance of employment takes place); Llo d D. McDonald, P-H 1944 TC Mu-.
DEc. SERv. ff 44,096 (1944) (company could repurchase if employee retired before age of
60 or if he retired without consent of Board of Directors after reaching age 0) ; Harold
H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 152 (1952). For use of restrictions in closed corporatuns, see
Spitzer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 967 (Sth Cir. 1946); Commissioner v. McCann, 145
F2d 385 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Halsted James, 3 T.C. 1260 (1944), aff'd per curiam, 148 F2d
236 (2d Cir. 1945).
57. It is true that restrictions may serve some valid purpose, but these purposes can
be achieved in other ways. Short-term restricti(,ns do help a corporation retain an em-
ployee's services for a specific period of time; but, except for the tax le, phole created
by such restrictions, the same results can be obtained by contracting either to offer a
1953]
844 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.62
hardly seems unfair, since it allows the courts and the Commissioner to cope
in a very simple way with what the restriction really seems to be: a tax
avoidance device.
bonus by way of a § 130A option if the emloyee performs the required services, or to
deliver a stock bonus to the employee after he has remained the required time, See Fred
C. Hall, 15 T.C. 195 (1950) ; and other cases cited note 50 supra. Similarly, long term
restrictions provide the employer with an effective weapon for inducing the employee to
remain with the company until he reaches retirement age. However, pension plans or
annuities, for example, under which the employee's rights are forfeited if he leaves the
company before he has reached retirement age are equally powerful devices,
If a closed corporation gives a managing employee stock, subject to repurchase, for
voting purposes, the same result can be achieved by making him a voting trustee, under
a voting trust which will terminate at the end of his employ. If stock is given so that
the employee will share in dividends, the size of which may well depend on his efforts,
the same goal can be reached by adopting a plan under which the employee receives a
share of the net profit.
